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In The Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah 
L. H. GATES, E. L. HANSEN, 
R. 0. PORTER and C. C. RANDALL, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
- vs-
. C. J. DAINES and M. ·C. DAINES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENTS 
Appeal No. 8243 
. , ' Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
' District of the State of Utah, in and . .for 
the County of Cache. ~~ 
·, 
.. ( ~ ' . 
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Room 8, Thatcher Bldg. 
Logan, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATE ME NT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------ 1 
AR G Ul\1ENT __________________ ----------------------------_ ___ ___ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ __ _ 3 
CON CL USI 0 N ___________ ----------------------------------------------_ ______ __ 8 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
31 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 478, p. 391 ________ 6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In The 
the 
Supreme Court 
State of Utah 
of 
L. H. GATES, E. L. HANSEN, 
R. 0. PORTER and C. C. RANDALL, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
- vs-
C. J. DAINES and M. C. DAINES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENTS 
Appeal No. 8243 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents feel that a further enlarged statement 
of facts is necessary to understand more fully the matter 
in issue. The agreement pleaded in the complaint and 
before the court for ~construction was entered into on 
December 9, 1953, with the appellants of the one part and 
the respondents of the other part. That prior thereto, 
all of the parties to this action constituted the Cache 
Valley Medical Group and leased the premises involved 
in this action from Zions Security Corporation. This 
lease provided: (Para. 4, Pl. Exh. 2) "Lessee rna y have 
the right of substituting occupants in the improved office 
space if one or more of the Lessees shall remove from the 
premises or other members join the group." 
And in paragraph 2 of said lease: "This lease shall 
be subject to termination by lessee at any time upon ninety 
days written notice to the lessor." 
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2 
Prior to August 7, 1953, the respondents decided to 
move from the premises, and served notice upon the 
appellants of their intention so to do. This notice is part 
of the record in this case identified as plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. 
A controversary arose as to the right of the respondents 
to move out and be relieved of paying rent under the 
lease, and the Agreement of December 9, 1953, which is 
set out in full in the complaint and in Findings of Fact 
No. 2, was entered into as a compromise setttlement. 
(Tr. 57) The respondents agreed to pay the appellants 
the sum of $55.00 per month during the term of the Zion's 
lease. The appellants then agreed to return to the re-
spondents the sum of $20.00 per month to cover the space 
which had theretofore been used by all of the parties 
jointly. The effect of this was to leave a net rental which 
the respondents were to pay to the appellants of $35.00 
per month to cover the space which had been occupied 
by the respondents individually. (Tr. 39 and 40, 58 and 
and 59). The respondents paid this net rental of $35.00 
for the months of December, 1953 and January, 1954, 
(Tr. 75) and then dis~covered that appellant Dr. C. C. 
Randall had moved into and occupied the rooms which 
had been previously occupied by respondent Dr. M. C. 
Daines, and thereupon respondents refused to pay the 
full $35.00 per month and tendered the sum of $17.50 for 
the month of February, 1954. (Tr. 74). This lawsuit 
followed, consisting of an action by the appellants to 
collect the full February rental in the sum of $35.00 from 
respondents. 
The question before the lower court was the inter-
pretation of the following paragraph found in the com-
promise agreement of December 9, 1953: 
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"It is further agreed that if the space upon which 
Doctors C. J. Daio.es and M. C. Daines are paying 
rent is sub-leased or rented to another party other 
than a member of the now existing group, thereby 
increasing the revenue received by the Cache Valley 
~vledical Group, that Doctors C. J. Daines and M. C. 
Daines are no longer obligated to pay rent on said 
space while so rented." 
The lower court determined that under said Agree-
ment, the respondents were paying said $35.00 per month 
rent on specific space, i.e., that used by them prior to 
their moving, and that under said agreement they were 
entitled to sub-lease said space in order to reduce the 
amount they had agreed to pay, and that they would be 
unable to exercise this right so long as Dr. C. C. Randall 
occuipied it without their permission. The court there-
upon determined that until Dr. Randall vacated said 
space, the respondents were relieved from paying one-half 
of said net rental. 
ARGUMENT 
This case was tried before the District Judge sitting 
without a jury. He heard the testimony of the witnesses 
and confronted them face to face. His findings are sup-
ported by the evidence and his conclusions of law are 
supported by the findings. Both the findings and the 
conclusions of law support the judgment. We see no 
basis upon which appellants can rely to have this judg-
Inent reversed by this court. 
It is respondents' theory of this case that under the 
agreement of December 9, 1953, they were paying $35.00 
per month rental on certain specific space, to-wit: Rooms 
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3, 4 and 5, which said rooms they had occupied exclusively 
while they were associated with the Group. It is their 
further theory that under the paragraph under interpre-
tation, they had the right to sublease said space if desired. 
This sublease could be either to a member of the remain-
ing group or to another party other than a member of the 
remaining group. 
If the sublease was to a member of the remaining 
Group, or to another party when there was no increase in 
rental to the group, the net rental to be paid by the re-
spondents would remain at $35.00 per month. If the 
sublease was to another party other than a member of the 
remaining group, and rent was received from this sub-
lessee, then the net rental to be paid by the respondents 
. would be reduced. But in any event, it was the respond-
ents, who were paying rent on the space, who could give 
the permission for a sub-tenant to move into this space. 
The record is clear that no such permission was given to 
Dr. Randall to move into the space upon which the re-
spondents were paying rent, and the court properly found 
;·;·;that the act of Dr. Randall in so doing constituted an 
evictio;n. 
The lower court accepted this theory of the case, and 
rightly so. Appelants argue that the respondents were 
not paying rent for any specific portion of the building, 
and state there was no particular portion of the building 
allotted to any individual. The evidence of witnesses for 
the appellants themselves, shows otherwise. Dr. Randall 
admitted on cross-examination that although there were 
no written agreements as to which space each would oc-
cupy, there were oral agreements. And see the testimony 
of Dr. C. J. n~aines on this point at page 72 of the Tran-
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script, and of Dr. M. C. Daines at page 93. Dr. Randall 
further stated that each of their individual rooms was 
theirs, and that no one else in the Group would concern 
themselves with nor interfere with those individual rooms. 
(Tr. 41, 42, 43 and 44). Dr. Randall also testified (Tr. 
58 and 59) that the $35.00 per month rental paid by the 
respondents under the December 9th agreement was for 
the space they (respondents) had been using sparately. 
Dr. Porter, another of the appellants, testified to the same 
effect, that the $35.00 per month net rental was for the 
individual space of the respondents. ( Tr. 39 and 40). 
And there are other factors which bear out the court's 
interpretation of the transaction. The agreement, in the 
paragraph set out in full above, specifically refers to 
"the space upon which (respondents) are paying 
rent # # • " (underlining ours). 
And specific use is made in said paragraph of the legal 
words "subleased." If we give the proper import to this 
language, it can mean only one thing, i.e., that the re-
spondents agreed to pay rent to the appellants for certaiAI 
space. This sets up a landlord and tenant relationship. 
The agreement then states that if this space is sub/cased, 
certain rights and liabilities wil arise. This leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that it is the respondents, the ones 
who agreed to pay rent on this certain space, who have 
the authority to sub-lease said space. It would certainly 
be a new twist to the law of landlord and tenant if it 
were to be held that the landlord could sub-lease the 
demised premises out from under the tenant who was 
paying rent upon it and otherwise complying with the 
terms of the rental agreement. 
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·We think that by reason of the paragraph in question, 
the respondents had the right to sub-lease the space upon 
which they were paying rent. If they sub-leased to a 
member of the remaining group free of further rent, then 
respondents were required to continue to pay the net 
rental of $35.00 per month. However, if respondents were 
·able to sub-lease to a tenant other than a member of the 
remaining group and secure rent from such a sub-lease, 
then they could. relieve themselves of the rent they had 
agreed to pay. 
It is undisputed that Dr. Randall moved into part of 
the space upon which the respondents were paying rent 
and that said move was made without their consent. He 
further stated that he would not move out to make way 
for a sub-lessee unless he (Dr. Randall) approved of the 
new· tenant. Such a position, if upheld effectually blocks 
the respondents from securing a sub-tenant, and forces 
them to pay the monthly rental as long as Dr. Randall 
desir~s, and during which time, mind you, while Dr. 
Randall would be using the space upon which the re-
spondents would be paying rent. 
What constitutes an eviction varies under different 
circuinstances, but all authorities agree that: 
"When use or possession ceases by reason of an act 
of the landlord, the consideration for the payment of 
rent ceases or fails.,, 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Ten-
ant, s·ec. 478, p. 391. 
What possible use or possession, or what right or control 
over the rented premises, could be exercised by the re-
·spondents so long as Dr. Randall occupies them and re-
fuses ·to move except to give way to a sub-lessee of his 
own choosing? 
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In concluding there are several points raised in ap-
pellants' brief, which should be commented on. 
On page 7, appellants argue the point that respond-
ents, in the August notice of their intention to move, made 
no claim that the space could not be occupied by the 
remaining members. It is obvious from the record that 
when this notice was sent, the respondents were operating 
under the theory that ~nder the terms of the Zion's lease, 
they could move and be relieved from contributing to the 
Groups rental. In other words, that it was contemplated 
under paragraph 4 of the Zion's lease that the group could 
change its membership. Why then, under such a theory, 
should there be any statement in such a notice that the 
rooms should be left vacant. When the appellants did 
not agree to this theory, a dispute arose, resulting in the 
December 9th Agreement. But this was long after the 
August notice had been sent. 
Appellants' brief carries throughout its pages several 
assertions that no one has ever applied or been interested 
in sub-leasing the space. The record shows otherwise. 
( Tr. 87 and 88). Without doubt, there were discussions 
with at least one doctor, and probably others, about sub-
leasing the very space involved in this lawsuit. 
Finally, on pages 8 and 9 appellants take some of the 
testimony of Dr. M. C. Daines out of context, and attempt 
to make it sound as though there were only one course of 
action open to the parties, i.e., bringing in someone from 
the outset thereby increasing the revenue. A study of the 
other testimony of Dr. M. C. Daines will show that it was 
his opinion that if someone else, other than him or his 
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father, occupied the premises involved without permission 
of the Daines', that the Daines would be relieved of paying 
rent. ( Tr. 95 and 98). 
CONCLUSION 
This is not an important case from the viewpoint of 
the substantive law of this state or insofar as the amount 
involved is concerned. And because of the singular nature 
of the particular provision before the court for construc-
tion, there is no case in point to refer to for guidance in 
making a decision. The District Judge had the benefit 
of having· the parties to the agreement before him, and 
·based on the evidence presented by them, he entered 
finding~ of fact, conclusions of law and judgment in favor 
of the defendants below, respondents here. These find-
ings of fact are supported by the evidence, and the con-
clusions reached from these findings are fair ones and 
reasonable ones. They support the judgment entered by 
the court. It is respondents' belief that under such cir-
cunms~ances, the interpretation placed on the agreement 
·by the lower court, as reflected in said findings, conclu-
sions and judgment, should not be lightly overturned. 
In our opinion, the judgment below should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfuly submitted, 
BULLEN & OLSON 
By Charles P. Olson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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